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STATE~1:ENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellants, D. A. Skeen, Bertha K. Skeen, 
and Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association, 
a Corporation, appeal from a jury verdict and judgment 
on the verdict entered therein, on the foreclosure of a 
1 mechanic's lien on real property pursuant to the pro-
1 
v1s1ons of Section 38-1-3, and Section 38-1-18 as 
amended, U.C.A. 1953, which verdict and judgment on 
the verdict was in favor of the Plaintiffs and against 
the Defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment on the verdict in favor of the Respondents 
and the denial of the Appellants' motion to have verdict 
and judgment set aside and to have judgment entered 
in accordance with Defendants' motion for directed 
verdict and motion for a new trial, Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the verdict and judg-
ment of the verdict, or new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to November 25, 1964, the Defendants and 
Appellants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, pur· 
chased a piece of real property in Summit Park, Sum· 
mit County, Utah, described as Lot 48, Summit Park, 
Plat "C" and executed and delivered to the Defendant 
and Appellant, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association, a Corporation, a deed of trust on said prop· 
erty which was recorded in Summit County, Utah, on 
or about the 30th day of November, 1964. 
2 
That upon the purchase of said property, the De-
fendants and Appellants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. 
Skeen, built a house on said property and permitted their 
daughter, Margaret l.Vlorton, to live in said property, 
provided she paid the monthly payments as provided by 
the trust deed with the Defendants and Appellants, 
Prudential l<-.ederal Savings & Loan Association. 
While said daughter was living in said property 
she apparently, but unknown to Defendants and Appel-
lants, D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, employed 
Plaintiffs and Respondents to do some landscape gar-
dening on said premises, consisting of sodding a very 
small lawn not to exceed twenty-five feet long and 
tapering to eight feet wide (Tr. 58) , with a small basin 
at one end containing water which was to be pumped 
some six feet high (Tr. 60) on the side of the mountain 
and returned by a small water fall to this basin, which 
was approximately four to six feet long and three feet 
wide, and in addition to this to clear some of the land 
of bushes and trees and vines. This work was apparently 
performed by Plaintiffs and Respondents between Aug-
ust and December, 1964. At no time did Plaintiffs and 
Respondents consult with or approach Defendants and 
Appellants with relation to this work and if an agree-
ment was ever entered into for these services it was done 
with Margaret Morton (Tr. 6, 7, 9-10). The only time 
Appellants were ever notified by Respondents that this 
work had been done, was when Respondent, Leon 
Frelmer, approached Appellant, Skeen, on or about 
February 8, 1965, and advised Skeen that the bill for 
3 
his services had not been paid (Tr. 42-43). It was then 
that Respondent, Leon Frelmer, learned that Mr. Skeen 
was the owner of the property in question (Tr. 44-45). 
Appellant, Skeen, then refused to pay Respondents 
(Tr. 46). Pursuant thereto, Appellants then proceeded 
to and did file a mechanic's lien on the property in ques-
tion ( Tr. 4 7) and then filed this action to foreclose this 
lien. After the commencement of this action, the De-
fendant, Margaret lVIorton, was killed in an accident, 
and the Appellants, at a pre-trial conference, had a 
discussion with relation to a substitution by way of an 
Administrator to be appointed for the estate of Mar-
garet Morton, and Appellants not deciding on such, 




THE COURT ERRED IN ITS PRE-
TRIAL ORDER, OVER THE OBJECTIONS 
OF APPELLANTS THAT THE PROPERTY 
IN QUESTION WAS SUBJECT TO LIEN 
RIGHTS FOR MATERIAL FURNISHED 
AND 'VORK AND SERVICES PERFORMED 
BY RESPONDENTS UPON SAID PROP-
ERTY. 
Section 38-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, provides as follows: 
"Contractors, subcontractors and a.ii persons 
performing labor upon or furnishing materials 
4 
to be used in, the construction or alteration of, 
or addition to, or repair of, any building, struc-
ture or improvement upon land - - - - - shall 
have a lien upon the property upon or concern-
ing which they have rendered service, performed 
labor or furnished material, for the value of the 
services rendered, labor performed or material 
furnished by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor or 
otherwise.'' 
Appellants in their answer denied that the Respon-
dents had any lien rights on the property in question, 
due to the type of work and services performed. The 
court in its pre-trial order (R. 21) over the objections 
of the Appellants and on motion to dismiss the complaint 
of the Plaintiffs on the question of having lien rights on 
said property, overruled said objections and denied the 
motion of Defendants and Appellants, which the Appel-
lants and Defendants contend is error and the court 
should have granted the motion and sustained the ob-
jections of the Appellants and Defendants to dismiss 
the complaint of the Respondents and Plaintiffs, with 
relation to their purported action on the foreclosure of 
a lien, and in support of this contention, Appellants 
submit the following: 
Does the work performed by Resvondents come 
within the JY[ eclwnic's Lien Strdute of the State of Utah? 
The work performed by Plaintiffs consisted of the 
<'onstruction of a small cement pool, and waterfall, some 
top soil, sodding a small lawn, cleaning yard, hauling 
5 
trash, cutting logs for firewood, etc. (Tr. 58-59-60) 
(Exhibit 8) . 
The law in the State of Utah is not clear as we hare 
been able to find, but we are of the opinion, that if' the 
work performed by Respondents comes within the 
statute at all, it must come within the "improvement" 
clause of the Statute. 
Timber Structures Inc. v. C. W. S. Grinding 
& Machine Works, 229 P.2d 623, at 629 Oregon. 
"We agree with Defendant that the right to a 
lien is purely statutory, and a claimant to such a 
lien, must in the first instance bring himself 
clearly within the terms of the Statute. The 
Statute is strictly construed as to persons entitled 
to its benefits and as to the procedure necessary 
to perfect the line, but when the claimant's right 
has been clearly established, the law will be liber· 
ally interpreted toward accomplishing the pur· 
posses of its enactment. 
Drake Lumber Co. v. Linquist, 170 P.2d 712; 
Phillips v. Graves, 9 P.2d 490, 83 A.L.R. l." 
36 Am. State Reports, 85 (Tennessee). 
"The claimant must make it clearly to appear 
that he has a lien. This lien is purely statutory 
and unknown to common law. Only those enum· 
erated and embraced in the statute are entitled 
to it. A liberal construction of the mechanic's 
lien law does not mean that they shall be liberally 
construed in enlarging or including others than 
those enumerated in the Statute. No one is en· 
titled to a lien unless the statute includes him or 
them. They are not to be included by strained 
6 
construction. Unless the Statute gives the lien 
the party has none." 
Howe v. Myers, 162 Pac. 1000, Washington. 
"It is well settled that liens of this character 
are in derogation of the common law. They de-
pend for their existence solely on the Statutes, 
and the courts refuse to extend their operation 
for the benefit of those who <lo not come clearly 
within the terms of the Statute." 
76 A. State Reports, 650. 
"A statute giving a lien upon land upon which 
a home has been constructed, built or repaired or 
fixtures or machinery furnished or erected or im-
provements made by special contract refers to 
things constructed upon the land, such as build-
ings, machines, fixtures and structures and not to 
the enriching of the soil and beautifying the 
grounds by planting flowers, shrubs, and trees 
and by grading and graveling the grounds and 
walks." 
36 Am. J ur., Page .55, Paragraph 66. 
"It has been held that a lien on building lots 
for grading is authorized by a statute giving a 
lien to any person who shall perform labor or 
services in altering or repairing any building or 
building lot. But where the labor and material 
for which a lien is claimed are not shown to have 
born any relation to the construction, alteration, 
or repai~ of any structure upon the land, the rule 
would seem to be otherwise. Such statutes are not 
to be construed as authori.ziny a lien for improve-
ments or operations upon the soil merely, which 
do not enter into or contribute to the erection, 
alteration or repair of any building or structure 
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upon the land and which are wholly unconnected 
with the creation of or work upon such artificial 
structures. Coene v. Staub, 36 N.W. 877; Pratt 
v. Duncan, 32 N.,iV. 709, Iowa; Howe v. Meyers, 
162 P. 1000, Washington. Similarly it has been 
held that merely enriching the soil and beautify-
ing the ground, and grading and graveling the 
grounds and walks, are not within the words, 
'improvements made,' where the same section of 
the statute uses the expression, 'building contem-
plated in this section'; nor is such work deemed to 
be within the term, 'Appurtenance'." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY, ESPECIALLY IN 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 9-A, 9-B, AND 9-C. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE TO THE JURY APPELLANTS' RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. l AND 6, 
AND APPELLANTS' REQUEST FOR SUB-
MISSION OF INTERROGATORY. 
It is the contention of the Appellants, in their 
defense of this case, that there existed no agency between 
Margaret Morton and Appellants authorizing her to 
employ Respondents to do the work on the subject 
property owned by these Appellants. That the work 
performed by Respondents was not known to the Appel-
lants until sometime after the work was performed. That 
no contract was ever entered into or authorized by Ap· 
pellants and Respondents for the performance of these 
8 
services. That the Respondents did not know, or inves-
tigate who owned the property until sometime after the 
services were performed and the material furnished 
('fr. 70). That at no time did the Appellants ever 
ratify or consent to the performance of these services 
and furnishing of material, and because of these facts 
the property in question never became subject to lien 
rights of the Respondents, if any they had. That at no 
time did Margaret Morton own any interest in this 
property, that she contemplated buying it from her 
father, Mr. Skeen, but had not entered into any contract 
to that end. 
There was some testimony that was introduced on 
the part of the Contractor who constructed the house 
on the property, that he informed :Mr. Skeen that .Mr. 
Frehner was on the property (Tr. 137-138), but it is 
the contention of Appellant that this would not bind 
Appellants, or estop Appellants from disclaiming any 
liability for the performance of these services or furnish-
ing material, and in connection with this we submit the 
following: 
Morrow v. Merritt, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac. 667 
( 1898). 
The owner of certain real estate leased the same to 
another who promised to make permanent improvements 
thereof. Plaintiff builder sue to impose a :Mechanic's 
Lien against the lessor's interest for materials and labor 
furnished in making the improvements. The trial court 
imposed a lien; the Supreme Court reversed, holding 
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that a mechanic's lien could not attach to the Lessor's 
interest in the absence of a principal-agent relationship. 
The knowledge and acquiescence of the owner did not 
estop him from showing that he had made no contract 
with the claimant, neither did it constitute a ratification 
of the Lessee's contract. 
The statute then in effect is found in Laws of Utah 
( 1894), Ch. XLI, p. 44. It is almost verbatim with our 
present statute; I find no substantial difference. Zane, 
J., pointed out that some states have statutes which 
would allow a lien to attach to the reversioner's interest 
by mere consent; he distinguished our statute: 
"Under this law the lien exists upon the inter-
est of the reversioner when the materials are 
furnished at his request, or upon the request of 
his agent or contractor. The request of the tenant 
is not sufficient, though he has bound himself 
to make improvements." (At 668.) 
This language favors Appellants in the instant case, 
for they made no request, for work or materials from 
Respondents, nor did their agent or contractor. 
Morrison v. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac. 235 
(1899). 
In this ~ase the defendant wife owned real estate 
in her own name. Her husband hired plaintiff to per· 
form work and furnish material for the construction of 
a dwelling upon the property. The wife knew that her 
husband had signed a written contract with plaintiff, she 
lived on the land and knew that the plaintiff was working 
10 
thereon, she did not prevent the erection of the building, 
but she never consented that her land should be liable 
under the contract. The trial court found for the plain-
tiff and imposed a lien; the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the husband had no power to bind the land 
of his wife: 
"While she knew of the contract, lived on the 
land, and did not prevent the erection of the build-
ing, she never consented to it, but on the con-
trary, objected to it, protested against it (to her 
husband), and never in any way gave her consent 
to it. She concealed nothing, and consented to 
nothing that was done, but objected to every-
thing that was done (to her husband). - Under 
such circumstances, no power resides in the hus-
band, as such, to bind the land of his wife." 
Her knowledge and occupation of the land did not 
change the rule. 
Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 97 Pac. lll 
(1903). 
The court reaffirmed its position. Here defendant, 
vendor of certain realty, sold the land under a contract. 
The vendee was supposed to make payments and con-
struct a house on the land. He did not make any pay-
ments, although he did pay interest; he constructed a 
building on the property and became indebted to plain-
tiff for materials. Plaintiff brought this action to fore-
close a lien against the real estate. The trial court denied 
the lien and the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Frick 
quoted with approval the following language from 
Morrow v. l\ilerritt (supra) : 
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"Doubtless statutes of other states mav be 
found giving a lien upon the interest of the l~ssor 
of land without a contract with him or his agellt, 
when materials or labor is furnished to the tenant 
' and employed with his consent in erecting buil<l-
ings or making improvements on the land. But, 
as we have seen, the Utah Statute ... requires 
the materials to be furnished or the services to be 
rendered upon the request of the owner of the 
land, or his agent, before the lien can arise upon 
his interest." 
Justice Frick then added: 
"Nor do we think that mere permission by the 
vendor to the vendee to make improvements 
would be sufficient, and certainly mere knowledge 
or acquiescence on the part of the owuer, is not 
sufficient under the statute." ( 114.) 
Burton ';\Talker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah 
92, 66 P.2d 134 ( 1937). 
This case involved a complicated fact situation in 
which the vendee of realty had plaintiff build upon the 
property. The court reaffirmed that the vendor's inter-
est could not in any case be subjected to the lien. 
In the recent case of Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 
6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957), plaintiff brought 
suit against both Lessor and Lessee for the value of 
materials used in improving a building. Judge Van Cott 
entered a judgment foreclosing a mechanic's lien against 
the leasehold interest only. The Lessee appealed. The 
Supreme Court, per Crockett, .f ., affirmed, holding that 
a lessee is an "owner" within the meaning of the me-
12 
chanic's lien statute and that his interest is subject to a 
lien for the value of improvements contracted for by 
him. This would strongly indicate, in Appellant's opin-
ion, that Respondents should have dismissed this action 
against Appellants D. A. Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, 
leaving the Respondents to look to the person with 
whom they contracted or her interest in the realty for 
security. 
The foregoing cases show that, though the Supreme 
Court pays lip service to the "rule" that ratification or 
estoppel could apply, it is not prone to allow these doc-
trines in actual cases. In most of these cases, even though 
the owner of realty benefited as a result of the claim-
ant's labor and improvements and had knowledge 
that the work was being done, the lien statute was 
held inapplicable against him. It would appear that in 
actual practice, the Supreme Court treats our statute as 
of the "contract" type whereunder a prior contract with 
the landowner is a prerequisite to doing work protected 
by the Statute. 
The statute itself does not read like a "consent" 
statute. It insists upon a contract, express or implied, 
with the owner; further, it is clear that the labor or 
materials must be furnished at the instance of the owner, 
his agent or contractor. This infers that the owner's 
request must precede the furnishing. 
Appellants' contend that the correct view would be 
to insist upon a contract in the first place, followed by 
the performing of labor or furnishing of material which 
13 
would effect the lien. See Thompson Real Property 
(4th ed., 1957) § 5189, at 285 (citing cases from 
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Maine, Massachusetts, l\'1ichigan, Minnesota, .Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Caro-
lina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 'Vis-
consin and West Virginia) . 
The foregoing is the position taken by the Colorado 
Supreme Court. Mellor v. Valentine, 3 Colorado 225 
( 1877). The court in this case reversed the lower court's 
imposition of a lien in the following language: 
"This in no wise dispenses with the necessity 
of showing a previous hiring, or contract with 
the owner or his agent under which the work was 
continuously done or material continuously fur-
nished. That the contract should be with the owner 
or agent is essential. The law imposes upon me-
chanics, like other persons, the necessity to ascer-
tain for themselves the nature of the interest in 
the land to be improved, of the persons ·with whom 
they contract, and all negligence in this regard 
is charged to their account." 
The compiler of the Utah Code lists the follo-wing 
under the footnotes on original history of the act: 
"The mechanic's lien law of this state was taken 
from Colorado, together with the construction 
placed thereon by the Colorado courts." 
This Mellor case was decided under the Colorado 
Statute before Utah adopted it; its rule that there be a 
contract with the owner preceding the beginning of work 
14 
should therefore be good law in the State of Utah at 
present. 
The statute provides for liens by "Contractors" and 
"Sub-Contractors." Since plaintiffs have no contract, 
express or implied, with the owner, they cannot be con-
tractors. Since they were not hired by the contractor 
(evidence shows that contractor disliked and distrusted 
him (Tr. 246), he was not a subcontractor. Section 
38-1-3 provides for a lien by "all other persons" but this 
is substantially qualified by "shall have a lien" ... for 
the value of the services ... whether at the instance of 
the owner or any other person acting by his authority 
as agent, contractor or otherwise." Plaintiffs did not act 
at the instance of the owner, his agent, or his contractor; 
he acted at the instance of a tenant, a licensee, or at most 
a vendee. A contract with a non-owner does not suffice 
to bind the owner. E.g., Lierz v. Cook, 435 Colo. 221, 
315 P.2d 535 (1957) (contract with licensee; lessor pro-
tected even though he had not filed notice of non-lia-
bility as required by Colorado Statute). Bunt v. Rob-
erts, 76 Idaho 158, 299 P2d 629 ( 1955) (contract with 
licensee); Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Bickel, 80 
Idaho 312, 245 Pac. 92 ( 1926) (contract with optionee) ; 
Morrison v. Clark, supra (Utah) (contract with spouse 
of owner); and Belnap v. Condon, supra, (Utah) (con-
tract with vendor) . 
The rule of refusing to bind the owner's interest by a 
contract with a non-owner is sound; otherwise there 
could be no security in property ownership for ambi-
15 
tious builders would forc>'er be building under contracts 
with non-owners and then forcing a sale of the land for 
their price. 
If the court holds that the Utah lien statute is of 
the "contract" type, there could be no lien imposed b>' 
estoppel or ratification, for to have a lien the contract 
would have to precede the beginning of the work. Even 
if a lien could be imposed by ratification or estoppel, it 
is the contention of Appellants that the evidence does 
not show the existence of either in this case. 
Ratification is defined as "confirmation after the 
act with full knowledge." Homes v. Hrobon, ________ Ohio 
... , 103 N .E. 2d 845, 869 ( 1951). 
The evidence shows that defendants, the Skeens, 
did not possess full knowledge; they were unable to 
visit the premises ('Tr. 112, 113, 115, 241, 24.lA), di<l 
not know the costs, etc. Therefore, they could not ratify. 
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has not yet 
found a contract ratified sufficiently to support a me-
chanic's lien; in Belnap v. Condor, 34 Utah 213, 97 
Pac. 111, the owner knew that the work was being done, 
was desirous of having it done, acquiesced without objec-
tion, and accepted the benefits therefrom, yet this was 
not a ratification. This seems to be the majority rule; 
mere inactive consent is insufficient in the absence of 
fraud. E.g., Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Bickel, supra; 
Snelling v. 'Vortman, 107 Ind. App. "1122, 24 N.E. 2d 
791 (1940). 
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As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, the reputed 
owner of property has no right to do anything which 
would give a lien on the premises. Further, the true 
owner's permission or knowledge of the improving is 
insufficient to authorize a lien thereon. Parker v. North-
western Investment Co., ________ Idaho ________ , 225 Pac. 307 
(1927). 
If theories of estoppel or ratification would support 
a lien, Respondents would have to show that Appellants 
had ratified or had so acted to be estopped. As noted 
above, it is necessary that one have full knowledge of all 
operative facts in order to ratify; not knowing Respon-
dents' price or what they were doing would seem to bar 
a ratification. 
The Utah Supreme Court defines estoppel thusly: 
" 'Equitable estoppel' or 'estoppel in pais' is 
the principle by which a party who knows or 
should know the truth is absolutely precluded, 
both at law and in equity, from denying or assert-
ing the contrary of any material fact, which, by 
his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, 
intentionally or through· culpable negligence, he 
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant 
of the true facts and who had a right to rely on 
such words and conduct, to believe and act on 
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be 
anticipated, changing his position in such a way 
that he would suffer injury if such denial or con-
trary assertion were followed." l\!Iigliaccio v. 
Davis, 120 Utah 1, 232 P.2d 198 (1951). 
The facts of the instance case do not fit into this 
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definition. The Appellants did not induce the Respon-
dents through their acts or conduct to rely on them or 
on the land itself for payment of the debt. Respondents 
had actual notice of Appellants' lack of confidence in 
his abilities (Tr. 248) through prior dealings for ·which 
Respondent Frelmer was not paid. 
Further Respondents were not excusably ignor-
ant of the fact that the fee title ·was in Appellants. The 
deed showing this ·was filed in the proper place putting 
Respondents on constructive notice of the true oYmer-
ship. See, e.g., Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Bicknel, 
supra; Royal Lmnber Co. v. Haelzner, ________ Iowa ________ , 
201 N.W. 53 (1924). 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANT-
ING APPELLANTS' l\IOTION FOR A DI-
RECTED VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSIOX 
OF RESPONDENTS' CASE. 
In view of the foregoing authorities, it is the eon-
tention of the Appellants that the court erred in not 
submitting the facts of this case to the jury, and direct-
ing the jury to return a verdict in favor of Respondents 
and against the Appellants as contained in Instructions 
Nos. 9-A and 9-B (R. 65). 
The court of its own volition and ignoring the 
petition of Appellants, decided that the land Ill 
question was subject to a lien; that there was an 
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agency existing between Margaret ::Morton and Appel-
lants and that the Appellants knew of the work going 
on and are estopped from denying these facts. These 
are facts which should have been submitted to the jury 
instead of the court deciding same. 
At the conclusion of the Respondents' case, the only 
evidence introduced by the Respondents that could apply 
to an estoppel was the testimony of the witness Brewer 
(Tr. 138-139) as follows: 
"Q. Did you talk to Mr. Skeen about Mr. 
Frehner being up there and making these im-
provements? 
A. Yes, I must have told him. He was up 
there, yes. 
Q. About when you would have known he was 
up there, and told Mr. Skeen about it? 
A. Well, I presume the time, approximately, 
he started the job." 
In view of the decisions in Morrow v. Merritt, 16 
Utah 412, 52 Pac. 557, supra, even if .Mr. Skeen had 
some information about Frehner being on the place 
would not amount to an estoppel. To the same effect 
is the case of Morrison v. Clark, 20 Utah 432, 59 Pac. 
235, supra, Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 213, 87 Pac. lll, 
supra, and other cases cited above. These cases hold that 
mere knowledge of the owner that some work is being 
done on his property would not amount to incurring 
a liability on the part of the owner nor subject the prop-
erty to a foreclosure of any lien rights. 
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There is evidence that l\Ir. Skeen consented that 
his daughter, .Margaret Morton, could go ahead with 
the landscaping (Tr. 247-248), but advised her not to 
employ Frehner. .Mr. Skeen testified as follows (Tr. 
245,246,248): 
"Q. '-\Then, if any time, did you learn any-
thing about this landscape gardening - the sub-
ject of this law suit - the gardening on these 
premises? 
A. Well, when they was getting out the plans, 
she said, 'I have been told that Frehner does good 
work, do you know him?' 
I said 'Yes, I had a very unfortunate experi-
ence with him one time, and I would a(hise you 
to seek another architect if you need one. · ' " 
Again (Tr. 248) : 
"Q. Who made the arrangement for the em-
ployment of l\fr. Frehner? 
A. lVIargaret, :Margaret as I have told you. 
I said, 'I don't - I have had an unpleasantness 
with him, and I would prefer you not do it.' " 
Again (Tr. 252): 
"Q. Now at any time in your conversation 
with Margaret about this matter, did you ever 
say anything or give her any permission to go 
ahead with this work? 
A. Absolutely not." 
Again (Tr. 259), Cross .Examination: 
"Q. So you were advised. in that conversation 
at least, it 'ms Frehner, and that he was going 
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to perhaps charge you more than would be rea-
sonable in Mr. Brewer's eyes? 
A. Charge it to Margaret. I had nothing to 
do with employing him. No contract. I had no 
knowledge what he was doing." 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence discloses that D. A. Skeen and Bertha 
Skeen, Appellants, are the owners of the property in 
question at all times mentioned. 
They placed their daughter Margaret .Morton in 
possession of the premises for the purposes of living 
there, provided she paid the monthly payments on the 
property with some understanding that if she later 
wanted to buy the property some arrangements could 
be made to that end. She was, at most, a renter or a 
tenant at will. 
The only person the Frehners contacted with rela-
tion to their work on this property was Margaret Mor-
ton, a renter or tenant at will. At no time did the Frehn-
ers contact the owners. In fact they did not know who 
was the owner of the property until along in February 
1965, when they learned that the Skeens owned the prop-
erty. They looked to Margaret Morton at all times 
with relation to payment. As an afterthought, when they 
could not get their money out of Margaret Morton 
they contacted Mr. Skeen and demanded payment from 
him, who refused to pay. 
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The deed to the property was on record in the 
Recorder's Office of Summit County at all times after 
the property was acquired and before the Frehners com-
menced work on this property. The law imposes the 
obligation on the lien claimant to ascertain the owner of 
the property he is working on as decided in lVlellor v. 
Valentine, supra. No such inquiry was made by Respon-
dents. 
vVhile there is evidence that Mr. Skeen consented 
to his daughter doing some landscaping on this prop-
erty, there was no authorization. A mere consent or per-
mission is not sufficient to bind the owner as decided in 
Morrow v. Merritt, supra. 
The evidence discloses that the Skeens never went 
on the property during the time the Frehners were per-
forming services thereon. There was no estoppel 
according to the definition of an estoppel as cited herein. ' 
There was no contract with the owner, either actual i 
or implied. 
It is very questionable as to the services performed 
and the material supplied that they were of the kind 
that would subject this property to lien rights. 
The ·court was in error in directing the jury to 
find in favor of Respondents for the above reasons. 
\Ve respectfully request of the court to analyze 
the decisions and the reasons of the cases and the law 
with relation to lien rights as the Appellants have 
respectfully submitted hereinabove. 
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In view of the foregoing we contend that the verdict 
and judgment on the verdict in this case be reversed and 
set aside, or grant a new trial to Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE 
Attorney for Appellants 
1301 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
) ' _j 
